Tag: lpr

  • Kansas Legislation Proposal


    HOUSE BILL No. ____

    AN ACT concerning law enforcement; relating to electronic surveillance and automated license plate recognition systems; requiring judicial warrants for specified searches and uses; prohibiting specified data sharing and surveillance technologies; establishing data-retention, auditing, reporting and enforcement requirements; prescribing criminal penalties and credentialing consequences; and providing for related matters.

    Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Kansas:

    Section 1. Short title.

    This act may be cited as the Kansas Warrant-Based Electronic Surveillance and Accountability Act.

    Sec. 2. Legislative findings and purpose.

    (a) The legislature finds that:

    (1) Automated license plate recognition systems can collect and retain location, date, time, photograph and license-plate information associated with a vehicle. Kansas law has defined “captured license plate data” to include those categories of information.

    (2) Kansas legislation has previously required law-enforcement agencies using automated license plate recognition systems to adopt written policies, limit access to legitimate law-enforcement purposes, document searches and alerts, and impose retention limits, subject to stated exceptions.

    (3) The United States Supreme Court has recognized that government acquisition or use of certain forms of detailed digital information can implicate substantial privacy interests and the Fourth Amendment. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014). The Court has also addressed the constitutional implications of prolonged location monitoring and sense-enhancing surveillance. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

    (4) The Legislature intends to establish clear statewide rules requiring judicial authorization before law-enforcement agencies conduct specified electronic searches or use specified surveillance technologies, and to provide for independent auditing and accountability.

    (b) The purpose of this act is to protect privacy and civil liberties while establishing enforceable limits on the collection, access, use, retention, and disclosure of electronic surveillance data by law-enforcement agencies and persons acting on their behalf.

    Sec. 3. Definitions.

    As used in this act:

    (a) “Automated license plate recognition system” or “ALPR system” means one or more cameras, sensors, software programs, or other devices, whether fixed, mobile, or remotely hosted, that automatically capture, read, record, analyze, or convert images or information concerning a license plate into searchable or computer-readable data. The term includes a system that captures associated location, date, time, vehicle, or image information.

    (b) “ALPR data” means any data captured, generated, derived, or stored by an ALPR system, including license-plate numbers, photographs, vehicle descriptions, global positioning coordinates, date and time information, alerts, query results, access records, and associated metadata.

    (c) “Hotlist” means a list of license-plate numbers entered into an ALPR system before a scan for the sole purpose of identifying a vehicle that is reported stolen, associated with an active arrest warrant, or the subject of a specific, documented, and active investigation of a felony or an endangered or missing person. A hotlist does not include a database, list, or query created or maintained for general intelligence, generalized surveillance, immigration enforcement, civil enforcement, or the identification or monitoring of persons based solely on protected activity or protected characteristics.

    (d) “Hotlist alert” means a system-generated match between a plate captured by an ALPR system and an entry on a hotlist.

    (e) “Law-enforcement agency” means any state, county, municipal, local, or university police department or other Kansas public agency employing or appointing law-enforcement officers, and any agent, contractor, or service provider acting on behalf of such an agency.

    (f) “Electronic search” means a query, scan, comparison, retrieval, or other use of an electronic system to obtain, identify, track, or analyze information about a person, vehicle, device, or location. The term includes a search of stored ALPR data and a search or use of a cell-site simulator.

    (g) “Judicial search warrant” means a warrant issued by a Kansas judge or magistrate with jurisdiction, upon a sworn application establishing probable cause and particularly describing the person, place, device, account, records, or data to be searched or seized. An administrative subpoena, contractual authorization, agency policy, or approval by a law-enforcement supervisor is not a judicial search warrant.

    (h) “Artificial intelligence system” means a machine-based system that generates predictions, recommendations, classifications, scores, identifications, or decisions from data and that is used to inform or materially influence a law-enforcement action. The term includes generative artificial intelligence and algorithmic systems used for predictive policing, risk scoring, automated investigative leads, biometric identification, or analysis of surveillance data.

    (i) “Facial-recognition system” means a system that analyzes or compares an image or video of a face to identify, verify, or infer the identity of a person, including a system that generates a face template, faceprint, or biometric match.

    (j) “Cell-site simulator” or “IMSI catcher” means a device or system that impersonates or mimics a cellular communications tower, or otherwise induces a cellular device to disclose identifying or signaling information, including an international mobile subscriber identity, international mobile equipment identity, or similar identifier.

    Sec. 4. Warrant required for electronic searches and ALPR data access.

    (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a law-enforcement agency shall not:

    (1) conduct an electronic search of ALPR data;

    (2) access, retrieve, query, or disclose stored ALPR data for an investigative or enforcement purpose;

    (3) use an ALPR system to track or monitor a particular person or vehicle; or

    (4) use or cause another person to use a cell-site simulator or IMSI catcher;

    unless the agency first obtains a judicial search warrant.

    (b) A judicial search warrant is not required for:

    (1) a real-time ALPR scan used solely to determine whether a captured plate matches a hotlist, provided the scan is not used to create, retain, or search a historical record except as expressly permitted by this act;

    (2) an officer’s observation of a license plate or vehicle in a place where the officer is lawfully present, without use of an ALPR system or access to stored ALPR data; or

    (3) an emergency disclosure or search strictly necessary to respond to an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury, if the agency documents the facts supporting the emergency and, where practicable, obtains judicial authorization before the search.

    (c) When an agency relies on subsection (b)(3), the agency shall prepare a written record within 24 hours describing the emergency, the information searched or disclosed, the persons who approved and conducted the search, and the reason a warrant could not be obtained in time. The agency shall apply for a warrant as soon as practicable if it seeks to retain or continue to use the information. Information obtained under the emergency exception shall not be used in a criminal proceeding unless a warrant is obtained or a court determines that the exception applied.

    (d) A judicial warrant under this section shall particularly describe the data sought, the relevant time period, the purpose of the search, and any limits on use, disclosure, and retention. An agency shall not use a warrant to conduct a generalized or indiscriminate search of ALPR data.

    (e) No provision of this act shall be construed to diminish any protection provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or section 15 of the Kansas Bill of Rights.

    Sec. 5. ALPR data retention and deletion.

    (a) A law-enforcement agency shall delete ALPR data not associated with a hotlist alert no later than 24 hours after the data are captured.

    (b) ALPR data associated with a hotlist alert may be retained only if:

    (1) the alert is verified by an officer before any stop, detention, or other enforcement action;

    (2) an officer documents the hotlist entry, the basis for the entry, the alert, the verification, and any resulting action; and

    (3) the data are relevant to a specific investigation or proceeding and are retained pursuant to a judicial search warrant, court order, or applicable records-retention requirement.

    (c) A hotlist alert, standing alone, does not establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause. An officer shall independently verify the plate and the factual basis for any proposed enforcement action.

    (d) An agency shall ensure that deletion under this section includes deletion from systems, backups, contractor-hosted storage, and other repositories within the agency’s possession, custody, or control, except where preservation is required by a judicial order or other controlling law.

    (e) Nothing in this section authorizes retention of data that another law requires to be destroyed sooner.

    Sec. 6. Prohibited sharing and access.

    (a) A Kansas law-enforcement agency shall not:

    (1) provide, disclose, sell, license, transfer, or otherwise make ALPR data available to a federal law-enforcement agency or federal entity;

    (2) permit a federal law-enforcement agency or federal entity to access an ALPR system, its data, its search functions, or its query results;

    (3) share or provide access to an ALPR system or ALPR data to a law-enforcement agency located outside Kansas; or

    (4) enter into, renew, or maintain an agreement, contract, memorandum of understanding, or other arrangement that would permit conduct prohibited by this section.

    (b) A Kansas law-enforcement agency shall not participate in an interstate or multijurisdictional ALPR network to the extent that participation permits access to or disclosure of ALPR data in violation of subsection (a).

    (c) This section does not prohibit disclosure specifically required by a final order of a court with jurisdiction, provided that the agency promptly gives notice to the attorney general and seeks appropriate protective relief when legally available.

    Sec. 7. Prohibited technologies.

    (b) A law-enforcement agency shall not acquire, lease, deploy, operate, access, or use a facial-recognition system.

    (c) A law-enforcement agency shall not acquire, lease, deploy, operate, access, or use an artificial-intelligence system for a law-enforcement purpose.

    (d) A law-enforcement agency shall not acquire, lease, deploy, operate, access, or use a cell-site simulator or IMSI catcher.

    (e) A public agency shall not use an independent contractor, private company, or other person to perform an act that the agency is prohibited from performing under this section. An agency shall not evade this section by outsourcing a system, search, analysis, or data-storage function.

    (f) A law-enforcement agency shall, within 90 days after the effective date of this act, cease prohibited uses, terminate or modify prohibited contracts to the extent legally permissible, and secure or destroy information held solely as a result of a prohibited use, subject to preservation required by a judicial order or other controlling law.

    Sec. 8. ALPR policies, access controls, and search logs.

    (a) Each law-enforcement agency that operates or has operated an ALPR system shall adopt and maintain a written policy implementing this act.

    (b) The policy shall, at a minimum:

    (1) identify each ALPR system and its owner, operator, vendor, and data-storage location;

    (2) require that each hotlist entry be specific, documented, and tied to a permitted purpose under section 3;

    (3) require warrant documentation for searches of stored ALPR data;

    (4) establish access controls limiting system access to personnel with an authorized role;

    (5) require training on this act and applicable constitutional protections; and

    (6) provide for preservation and production of records needed for an audit or investigation under this act.

    (c) Each agency shall maintain an auditable log of every ALPR scan, alert, query, search, access, disclosure, export, modification, and deletion. The log shall include, as applicable:

    (1) the date and time of the event;

    (2) the identity and agency of the person initiating or approving it;

    (3) the system and account used;

    (4) the plate or other search term entered;

    (5) the stated purpose and associated case, incident, or warrant number;

    (6) the warrant or court-order identifier, if applicable;

    (7) the data accessed, disclosed, or exported and the recipient; and

    (8) the date and method of deletion.

    (d) An agency shall preserve logs for at least five years. Logs shall be protected against unauthorized alteration and shall be made available to the auditor general, the attorney general, and a court of competent jurisdiction as provided by law.

    Sec. 9. Statewide audit.

    (a) The Kansas attorney general, in coordination with the Kansas legislative post audit committee and the auditor of state, shall conduct or arrange for an independent audit of ALPR systems and ALPR search logs maintained or used by every state, county, municipal, local, and university law-enforcement agency.

    (b) The audit shall review, at a minimum:

    (1) all ALPR search logs for the five years preceding the effective date of this act, to the extent records remain available;

    (2) whether searches were supported by a judicial search warrant or a documented statutory exception;

    (3) whether searches had a documented, specific law-enforcement purpose;

    (4) whether data were retained or deleted in compliance with applicable law and agency policy;

    (5) whether data or system access was provided to federal entities or out-of-state law-enforcement agencies;

    (6) whether an agency used a prohibited system or vendor, including Flock Safety; and

    (7) whether access, use, disclosure, or retention records were incomplete, altered, or destroyed.

    (c) Within 12 months after the effective date of this act, the auditor shall submit a public report to the governor and the legislature. The report shall identify agency-level compliance findings, violations, corrective actions, and recommendations. The report shall not disclose information whose disclosure is prohibited by law or would compromise an active investigation.

    (d) Each agency shall preserve and provide records reasonably required for the audit. An agency shall not impede, delay, or knowingly provide materially false information to an auditor conducting an audit under this section.

    (e) The attorney general shall conduct follow-up audits at least once every three years and may conduct an additional audit upon reasonable grounds to believe that an agency has violated this act.

    Sec. 10. Enforcement; criminal and credentialing consequences.

    (a) A person commits a violation of this act if the person knowingly or recklessly:

    (1) conducts or causes an electronic search prohibited by this act;

    (2) accesses, shares, discloses, or retains ALPR data in violation of this act;

    (3) uses a prohibited system or technology in violation of section 7;

    (4) knowingly evades a warrant requirement or data-retention limitation imposed by this act;

    (5) knowingly falsifies, alters, or destroys a search log or audit record required by this act; or

    (6) knowingly directs, permits, or assists another person in conduct prohibited by this act.

    (b) A willful violation of subsection (a) is a severity level 9, nonperson felony.

    (c) A person who willfully violates this act while acting under color of law shall, upon conviction:

    (1) be subject to the penalty prescribed in subsection (b);

    (2) be referred to the Kansas Commission on Peace Officers’ Standards and Training for revocation of the person’s law-enforcement certification or credentials, following notice and an opportunity to be heard; and

    (3) be ineligible for certification or employment as a law-enforcement officer in Kansas, subject to applicable law and the procedures of the Commission.

    (d) The attorney general may bring a civil action to enjoin a violation of this act and to obtain appropriate declaratory or other equitable relief. A person whose information was unlawfully searched, accessed, disclosed, or retained may seek appropriate relief in a court of competent jurisdiction.

    (e) Evidence obtained in violation of this act shall be subject to suppression in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, to the extent permitted by the United States Constitution, the Kansas Constitution, and other applicable law.

    (f) Nothing in this section limits prosecution under another applicable criminal statute or the authority of a court to impose additional remedies.

    Sec. 11. Construction and severability.

    (a) This act establishes statutory protections in addition to any protections otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, the Kansas Constitution, or other law.

    (b) If any provision of this act or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

    Sec. 12. Effective date.

    This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its publication in the statute book.

  • After My Email, I Submitted Open Records Requests. Here is the First One.

    The August 21st Public Records Request

    Pursuant to the Kansas Open Records Act (“KORA”), K.S.A. 45-215 et seq., I respectfully request copies of the following records maintained by the City of Ottawa and its departments therein relating to the acquisition, deployment, and use of automated license plate readers (“ALPRs”).

    What companies does Ottawa or its departments contract with for its License Plate Reader (LPR)/ Automatic License Plate Reader (ALPR)?

    Does Ottawa use any other electronic technology like noise detection technology? If so, with which companies?

    Contract date(s) with these companies.

    Dates of City Council meetings discussing the presentation, proposals, procurement, and locations of these technologies.

    If those dates predate the information available on the City’s portal, provide copies of the agendas, minutes, and link to the meetings.

    Emails and text messages between any representatives of the City (past and present) and these companies; and emails and text messages between past and present members of the City Commissioner, City staff, and any members of City Departments, ie. Chief of Police discussing the ALPR/LPR and noise detection systems.

    I prefer this information sent to the provided email address.

    _____________________________________________

    The Response

    Invoice sent – $254.40

    Good morning,

    The City has reviewed your open records request and has prepared an estimate for the initial search and export of potentially responsive records.

    The estimated time and cost for the initial search and export is as follows:

    • Information Technology: 2 hours at $26.76 per hour = $53.52
    • Ottawa Police Department [Chief of Police]: 8 hours at $25.11 per hour = $200.88

    The total estimated cost for the initial search and export is $254.40.

    Please see the attached invoice. This estimate is limited to the time required for City staff to search for and export potentially responsive records based on the scope of your request.

    This estimate does not include the time required to review the records for responsiveness, identify information that may require redaction or withholding under KORA, complete any necessary redactions or legal review, or prepare the records for release.

    Once the initial search and export is completed and the number of potentially responsive records is known, the City will determine the estimated time and cost necessary to review, redact, and prepare the responsive records for release. We will provide that additional estimate before proceeding with that portion of the request.

    Once payment of the attached invoice has been received, the City will begin the initial search and export. Due to the scope of the request and current staffing availability, the City estimates that the initial search and export will take approximately three weeks from the date payment is received to complete.

    Payment may be made by calling 785-229-3600, Option 1, and letting staff know you are making payment for an open records request.

    Thank you,

    Melissa Scherman

    Now, the back and forth

    I am submitting this request for non-commercial purposes, in the public interest of understanding the acquisition, oversight, and use of surveillance technology by a Kansas public agency, and I respectfully ask that any available fee reduction or waiver be applied on that basis.

    Message to requester

    Good afternoon,

    Thank you for providing the additional information regarding the purpose of your request.

    The City has considered your request for a fee waiver or reduction. At this time, the City will not be waiving or reducing the fees associated with processing this request.

    The estimated fees reflect the staff time necessary to search for and export potentially responsive records.

    The previously provided estimate and invoice will therefore remain in effect.

    Thank you,

    Melissa Scherman

    My response

    At this time, I am requesting this request be closed.

    I am going to submit a new request to expand the data desired so I am not burdening anyone with additional work as the new request should include data available while gather information from this request.

  • How this journey got started

    How this journey got started

    On August 21, 2026 I sent this email to the Ottawa, Kansas Chief of Police:

    Hello Chief Weingartner,

    I am writing you to respectfully request you to terminate the use of the Flock cameras in town. My request comes from the growing concerns about potential for 4th Amendment violations across the country. The Flock Transparency Portal shows the four cameras in town only yield a .7% match to potential hotlist plates, while 99.3% of innocent Americans are being recorded and stored in the Flock database.

    Additionally, it seems we are seeing more and more instances of misuse of these systems, with several recent incidents nearby and all across the country. 

    I further ask you to audit the use of the Flock database in your department. I was on a website two days ago that allowed me to see how many times your officers accessed Flock to perform searches. I do not recall which website, but, if the data is correct, you have one officer that has over 200 searches, and your next highest officer is at 70. It would appear there is a potential that this officer in question is misusing governmental information systems or worse.

    Please, be proactive, stop using Flock, use the exit clause in your contract immediately and show your residents their right to privacy matters to you and avoid any potentially costly litigation on this matter.

    Respectfully,

    Daniel Williams

    I received an Out of Office reply.

    _____________________________________________

    Two days later, I followed up with this information:

    Chief,

    As a follow up to my previous email, the officer in question is Aaron Procaccini.

    On Fri, Aug 21, 2026 at 7:35 PM Adam Weingartner <aweingartner@ottawaks.gov> wrote:

    I am out of the office and not available.  Please call 785-242-2561 Ext. 0 for assistance.  

    Thank you.

    He still has not replied to either of my emails even though he has been at work. Can anyone confirm this is his email address or does he have a PD email?

  • Did the Police Chief Act      Without Legal Authority?

    Did the Police Chief Act Without Legal Authority?

    It seems the answer is ‘yes’. 

    As I continue to investigate the acquisition and deployment of the ALPR systems here in Ottawa, Kansas, the more questions I have.  

    This all began as a campaign to have the Flock/ALPR cameras removed from a small town. As far as I was aware, after all, there were only four cameras. On August 21, 2026, I emailed the Police Chief a very respectful request to cancel the contract and remove the cameras like his peers recently had done in their towns. Additionally, I provided information available online that brought the actions of one former officer into question for the number of searches he had performed. This one officer had over 200 searches to his name in a short timeframe. The next highest officers’ searches were 70. That email and the follow up received an out-of-office reply and still to this date, no response from the Chief. I figured I hit a nerve and wondered why. 

    I started raising questions in various groups on Facebook which led to the start of my Facebook page DeFlock Ottawa KS and the start of this blog under the name Taking a Stand Again. One might think that if I make enough noise, the city’s leadership would say it is not worth the headlines and remove them like Gardner and Wellsville. Well, that is only if the City Council is aware of the cameras and my efforts. 

    I started digging into what Flock actually was and what it can do. That heightened my sense of curiosity and overall disgust that the seemingly quiet town of Ottawa would allow itself to become a part of this mass surveillance network.  

    What I am finding is, the more layers I pull back, the worse the smell. 

    My first step was to submit a very simple open records request for basic data that should have been readily available. When I got my invoice from the City Clerk Melissa Scherman I knew I was on to something here. There is no way the data I requested should have taken 2 hours with the IT Department and another 8 hours with the Chief of Police being the custodian of the rest of the records, especially when all but one of the records was the City Clerk’s responsibility. I wasn’t surprised though; I was warned by many others that the City is not very transparent and likes charging a lot of money when they do not want to release records. After much back and forth with the City Clerk, I asked her to close that records request and I would submit a new expanded request to expedite thing verse doing several smaller requests. 

    The new request took the old one and added new requested information. When I received the new invoice, it no longer showed IT department, still did not show the City Clerk, and only had the Chief of Police as the only records custodian for all responsive records requested. That elevated my curiosity beyond any previous concerns and questions I had. At this point I knew something was off, and the Chief was attempting to prevent me from finding out what that was. I was now quoted 15 hours of his time, and it would take two weeks to complete. I forgot to mention that I wanted to personally inspect the records. I did not need any records copied, emailed, or electronically produced. I just wanted to verify that they existed. This request has been going back for the better part of a month now and is still pending. 

    In the meantime, I started digging online, looking for anything relevant. I expected to find a proposal or presentation by Flock and other ALPR providers trying to earn the contract, an agenda showing it went before the City Council, a meeting link to watch, and minutes reflecting the discussion and decision of the City Council as required by law. This, followed by the City Planning Commission, rubber stamping the approval of four ALPR cameras in town. That is exactly what I did not find. I have scoured the City of Ottawa’s webpages performing searches that should have led to a discovery of any input by the city’s leadership. 

    I have used search terms like, ‘ALPR’, ‘LPR’, ‘Flock’, ‘Camera’, ‘license plate reader’, ‘license plate scanner’, and ‘Police’. I have used those terms in the city ordinances, the main website search function, and in the budgets for the city and the police department.  Below is the only result that meets those terms relating to ALPR, and the only mention is ‘Flock’ on the last line of the meeting minutes under public comments by Sam White.   

    Now, at this point, there is zero indication that there are any public records available that relate to Flock or any ALPR in Ottawa. Here’s where things get murky and start looking like the line between legal and illegal gets crossed. My first question was, ‘if the Ottawa City Council did not approve the funding, where did the money come from?’ Well, after my public comments during the Ottawa City Commissioner’s meeting, I had my answer.  The Ottawa Police Foundation.  

    Here is an excerpt from their IRS Form 990EZ to show it is pulled from the IRS website directly. 

    Notice the second name, Adam Weingartner below. He is listed as the 2IC or second in charge under the title of EX OFFICIO M, or “by virtue of an office”. Adam Weingartner is also the Chief of Police for Ottawa. 

    The next clip shows the foundation paid for two LPR. This is under Line 30 in this section. 

    A trusted source ensured me he found documentation showing the cameras located on the two roads leading to Walmart were donated by Walmart. He wasn’t wrong. I did some digging and found the list of donors publicly acknowledged on their website: https://www.ottawapf.org/Donate.html . Take notice to the highlighted line below.  

    Here, you can see Walmart made three separate donations under the parent umbrella. What is not explained here is what the * indicates. 

    The next link in the chain comes from the fact that around June 2023, The Ottawa Walmart Supercenter received two Flock Safety ALPR cameras to record every vehicle moving along the only two roads that provide access to the store. One at the top of the picture is high up on a light pole on the north side of Freddy’s facing east towards Walmart on 21st Terrace. The second camera is south in front of Wendy’s also facing east. 

    So, naturally, my next question is, ‘Because the cameras were not approved or paid for by the City, who authorized the cameras installation in the City’s public utility easement?’ Now, I have to dig into this more, but, as I said previously, the City Planning and Zoning Committee never approved the installation in a public hearing or on the record. My next step is to go to the public works department to request to see the work orders, engineering surveys, authorization documents, etc….if they exist. My suspicion is this was done via a work order from Flock to Dish Network, as they were the subcontractors doing most Flock installations around the country. 

    Another question is, ‘If the City Commissioners never approved a Flock contract, how does the police department have access to Flock database? Flock requires a contract, memorandum of understanding, or pilot program agreement to move forward. Someone signed the contract, who? 

    At this point, I no longer wonder if Adam Weingartner broke the law, I wonder just how many laws were broken and are still being broken because of this arrangement?  Here’s what I have come up with to date.  

    Every time anyone uses the Flock database for any reason, it may be a computer crime. Couple that with the fact that the city leadership were blind to Flock, and there are no city ordinances regulating its use, it stands to reason no one outside the police department actually knows if any officers have been unlawfully using their access to the system. I love the quote from Ronald Reagan, “trust, but verify.” Especially given the growing numbers of offices being suspended, demoted, fired, arrested, charged, and convicted for unlawful use of Flock and other ALPR systems. 

    I believe the following applies here: 

    KSA 21-6002. Official Misconduct.  Official misconduct occurs when any public officer performs an unauthorized act under the color of office or public capacity. In this case, awarding Flock Safety a contract without legal authority to do so and without prior approval of the City Council and City Planning and Zoning Committee. Additionally, doing so without any competitive bidding process, nor legal authority to enter the City of Ottawa into a multi-year Software as a service contract. 

    KSA 21-6005. Misuse of Public Funds.   Misuse of public funds occurs in this situation when, city resources, like public utility easements are used without permission, when utility poles are used without permission, and when on-duty officers are used to monitor surveillance cameras that were never authorized by the City Council. 

    KSA 21-5801. Theft or Fraud. Theft or fraud may have occurred by Adam by utilizing a profit organization to secretly move money or if he misrepresented the truth about his legal authority to procure Flock cameras for the City. If he did, that is theft by deception. 

    KSA 10-1101. The Kansas Cash-Basis Law. This law prohibits cities and their departments from creating any financial obligations or debt before the money has been budgeted and appropriated by the City Council. 

    Resolution 1846-20. In this resolution, the City established a requirement for competitive bidding and explicit City Council approval for any city-wide technology contracts or infrastructure projects. 

    Illegal Use of Property. Installing equipment on public property, in public rights of way, or on city owned utility poles without an approved municipal agreement or council resolution is illegal trespassing and unauthorized modification. 

    Additionally, it raises the question of who actually has access to the database. Since the foundation paid for the cameras, do they have access? Regardless, one thing is for sure in my mind this is why my public records requests were going through the police chief and why I was being charged so much. He was banking on me saying never mind, it is not worth that much to find out. Wrong. Just like police like to say, the absence of evidence can tell a story as well. 

    In the meantime, I have contacted new outlets to see if they want to pick up the story, and I will keep reaching out until one does. 

    Additionally, I have requested the County Attorney investigate my concerns, though, I doubt he will do much, given his office is also a listed donor to the Ottawa Police Foundation.  Seems like a conflict of interest. Because of that, I also filed a report with the Kansas Attorney General and the Kansas Bureau of Investigations to investigate the perceived violations of state law.